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If nothing else is true about him, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was skeptical about 
morality.i  In his most famous dissent, Lochner v. New York, Justice Holmes can be heard 
admonishing his colleagues for mistaking their views of political morality for a self-evident 
truth.  He began his dissent saying, “This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large 
part of the country does not entertain.”ii  The economic theory in question was laissez-faire 
economics.  While his colleagues thought they knew that liberty, the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, required legislatures to adopt a laissez-faire approach to economic 
issues, Holmes was far less sure.iii  The fact that many people thought otherwise was even more 
reason for caution and judicial restraint.  Though Holmes has largely been lauded for the 
Lochner dissent,iv for his general skepticism, Holmes has drawn ire from many, and some have 
labeled him a “nihilist,”v a “Nietzschean,”vi or both.vii 
 This chapter demonstrates that Holmes was no Nietzschean nihilist.  Such an accusation 
is triply mistaken.  Holmes was no nihilist, nor was he a Nietzschean, and there is no such thing 
as a “Nietzschean nihilist” because Nietzsche was no nihilist either. 
 This chapter begins with offering a definition of “nihilism” that will serve as a touchstone 
for the proceeding discussion.  Only with the definition of “nihilism” fixed can we have a 
productive conversation about whom should have the label.  After this preliminary work, I turn 
to the three main tasks of the chapter: showing that Holmes was no nihilist, that he was no 
Nietzschean, and that Nietzsche and Holmes are both anti-nihilists.  On the first task, I not only 
offer textual support for a non-nihilist reading of Holmes, but I also try to explain why some 
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commentators have erroneously called Holmes a nihilist.  On the second task, I argue that the 
differences between Holmes and Nietzsche are too great – and the similarities too few and 
commonly found – for it to make sense to call Holmes a Nietzschean.  The final task of the paper 
aims to show that both Nietzsche and Holmes are anti-nihilists.  As I show, those commentators 
who label Nietzsche a nihilist are making a similar kind of error as those who call Holmes a 
nihilist.  Both kinds of critics miss the fact that both Holmes and Nietzsche are in different ways 
responding to nihilism.  Thus, the final section of this chapter serves to underscore the message 
of the first two: Holmes is not a Nietzschean precisely because he is a different kind of anti-
nihilist. 
 
Defining Nihilism 
Like “realism,” “positivism,” “pragmatism,” and so many other philosophical terms, 
“nihilism” has come to refer to more than one idea.  In what follows, I distinguish between two 
senses of the term, what I call nihilism1 and nihilism2.  With the distinction drawn, we see what 
Holmes’s commentators must have had in mind, for only one of these names a full-fledged 
philosophical position that can be the subject of agreement, disagreement, or scorn. 
To grasp what it is to be a nihilist1, consider the following.  We are all nihilists1 about 
witches, phlogiston, and the ether.  What do those things have in common?  We do not believe 
they exist.  To deny that x exists is to be a nihilist1 with respect to x.  With that said, it should be 
clear that one cannot be a nihilist1 simpliciter.  One can be a moral nihilist1 (denying the 
existence of moral properties), a theological nihilist1 (denying the existence of deities), a 
doxastic nihilist1 (denying the existence of beliefs), or a nihilist1 about any other purported 
property or object, but to be a nihilist1, one has to deny the existence of something in particular.  
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Even if one denies the existence of everything, that is, even if one holds global nihilism1, the 
global modifier is still needed.viii 
To be a nihilist2 is to hold the view that life is somehow meaningless, hollow, or not 
worth living.  Put this way, it would seem that nihilism2 is just a form of nihilism1, one on which 
the adherent denies the existence of “meaningfulness in life.”  This characterization of nihilism2 
misses something: nihilism2 involves a negative practical attitude toward life.
ix  In the cultural 
imagination, the melancholy nihilist2 may arrive at her nihilist2 stance because she holds a 
nihilist1 view about morality or gods, but these kinds of nihilism are distinct.  For instance, it is 
possible to reject theological nihilism1 while continuing to deny that life is worth living; one 
might have this combination of views because one thinks life, as the plaything of an omnipotent 
being who expects one’s obedience, is a hollow, worthless experience.  Alternatively, it is 
possible to accept moral nihilism1 while continuing to see life as fully worth living; one might 
have this combination of views because one finds the metaphysics of morality wholly irrelevant 
to our practical lives.x 
It is widely believed that Holmes was a nihilist1 about certain things, but, in calling him a 
nihilist, some of his various interpreters were saying more than that.xi  They thought he was a 
nihilist2.  This is the right reading of these interpreters for several reasons.
xii  The most important 
of which is the grammatical reason suggested above.  Interpreters write things like, “The 
filaments of [Holmes’s] thought are astonishing in their variety… One can find pragmatism, 
atheism… nihilism.”xiii  If we understand this commentator as claiming that Holmes was a 
nihilist1, he has to be saying something too incomplete to be meaningful or something entirely 
trivial.  Either commentator has left out the object of Holmes’s denial, which leaves the reader 
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entirely in the dark, or the commentator merely meant to say that there is something that Holmes 
does not believe in, which is trivial because everyone denies the existence of something.xiv 
The preceding argument should be dispositive.  Thus, our debate concerns whether 
Holmes (or Nietzsche) is rightly called a nihilist2.
xv 
 
Holmes is not a Nihilist 
To see Holmes as a nihilist is to see him as a man who denies the existence of objective 
moral principles, who denies the existence of God, who denies that the Universe has any grand 
plan for human beings, and who, on the basis of these denials, detaches from life and becomes 
depressed.  Such depression may express itself alternatively as melancholy or reckless abandon, 
but both attitudes stem from the practical stance that life is not worth living. 
Albert Alschuler gives melodramatic voice to this understanding of Holmes.  Alschuler 
reads Holmes as someone who found life meaningless and intermittently cared about nothing or 
advocated for reckless abandon.  Alschuler draws attention to the fact that in Holmes’s diary, he 
devoted one word to discuss his wedding that day, “Married.”xvi  Alschuler even points out that 
Holmes did not take a honeymoon as further proof that Holmes was a gloomy nihilist.xvii  Other 
supposed proof is the fact that Holmes “rarely supported charities or political causes.”xviii  In one 
place, Alschuler writes, “Holmes had the courage of his nonconvictions.”xix  On the reckless 
abandon variety of nihilism, Alschuler cites “[Holmes’s] frequent glorification of the death of 
soldiers committed to causes they do not understand.”xx 
Alschuler is not alone in seeing Holmes as a nihilist.  While others avoid the specific 
term, they too read Holmes as a nihilist, whose skepticism went too far for his own good.  One 
1940s commentator summarized Holmes’s thinking thusly: “Mr. Justice Holmes pursued truth 
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with vigor. … there is something pathetic in the man’s life-long search for… ‘an echo of the 
infinite, a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law.’  It was a search that 
ended where it began, in the gloomy labyrinth of doubt and skepticism.”xxi  This same 
commentator wrote, “A dark sunless thing is Holmes’ conception of man.”xxii 
Though I disagree with the “nihilist” label, Holmes’s critics do get a few things right.  He 
was no firm believer in deities or true moral values, but, as Holmes himself noted, “it does not 
follow that, without such absolute ideals we have nothing to do but to sit still and let time run 
over us.”xxiii  In other words, Holmes saw his skepticism as no reason to become depressed.  
Holmes was not nihilistic.  He greeted life with a good deal of optimism and energy, maybe even 
too much optimism, as some commentators have said.xxiv  In one place he wrote, “We all, the 
most unbelieving of us, walk by faith.  We do our work and live our lives not merely to vent and 
realize our inner force, but with a blind and trembling hope that somehow the world will be a 
little better for our striving.”xxv  Holmes, like many of us, by turns chose to look away from our 
own inevitable demise and to think happy thoughts.  As he once told a friend, “I dare say that the 
best way is not to bother about death until it comes, but just crack ahead.”xxvi  Consider also how 
Holmes spoke about growing old: “as soon as a corner is turned the road stretches away again 
and ambition to go farther returns.”xxvii  If he really were committed to the thought that life was 
not worth living, if he really thought that life was but a “gloomy labyrinth,” what should we 
make of this ambition to go farther? 
To sum up the discussion thus far, some critics of Holmes call him a nihilist because they 
make a certain inference.  They infer nihilism from Holmes’s skepticism, atheism, and supposed 
moral nihilism.  Holmes outright said that this is a bad inference.  Samples from Holmes’s 
writings also reveal that he did not hold the relevant practical stance toward life that nihilism 
Raff Donelson 
6 
 
requires.  I have not yet explained why Holmes found the inference bad, that is, why Holmes did 
not come to hold a negative practical stance toward life, given his other commitments.  Below I 
explain this and, in the course of that explanation, demonstrate that Holmes was more than a 
non-nihilist, he was an anti-nihilist.xxviii  Before that discussion, however, I explain why Holmes 
is no Nietzschean. 
 
Holmes is not a Nietzschean 
Several commentators compare Holmes and Nietzsche and conclude that these two 
shared quite a bit intellectually.xxix  In this section, I consider two lists of supposed similarities 
between Holmes and Nietzsche.  One list comes from Alschuler, the other from Posner. 
Alschuler has an impressive list of similarities that is worth setting out in full: 
 
Holmes and Nietzsche were born three years apart and had much in common.  [1] Both 
viewed life as a struggle for power; [2] both were antireligious [small qualification 
omitted]; [3] both saw ethics as lacking any external foundation; [4] both could fairly be 
regarded as existentialists; [5] both saw the suffering and exploitation of some as 
necessary to the creative work of others; [6] both were personally ambitious and had a 
strong work ethic (possibly reflecting their Protestant heritage); [7] both had a strong 
sense of personal destiny; both viewed the disciplined, creative life as an ideal; [8] both 
often seemed indifferent to the feelings of those around them; [9] both found in their 
wartime experiences a metaphor for the universe at large; and [10] both had military-style 
moustaches.xxx 
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Posner adds a few more items.xxxi  While I review Posner’s list of similarities below, first I 
examine that of Alschuler.   
Alschuler’s ten points of comparison, when taken together, seem to make a strong case 
for Holmes being a Nietzschean (or Nietzsche a Holmesian).  On closer inspection, of those 
points of comparison that are actually true, these traits are far too common to say anything 
significant.  For instance, items (1), (2), and (3) on the list are true of Holmes and Nietzsche and 
arguably true of Marx, Darwin, and Freud as well.  My point is not “therefore, we should 
conclude that Holmes is just as much a Nietzschean as he is a Marxist, Darwinian, or Freudian.”  
Instead, I am pointing out that (1), (2), and (3) were au courant ideas among radicals during the 
latter half of the Nineteenth Century.  Many of the most famous thinkers from that era espoused 
those things; thus, mentioning these similarities between Holmes and Nietzsche should not move 
us very far toward the thought that they shared a comprehensive philosophical outlook.  Item (4) 
is false because Holmes is not an existentialist, but proving this will have to come later.  Item (5) 
is true, but believing that some people’s creative work depends on others’ exploitation is 
commonplace.  From the pyramids of Giza to the American transcontinental railroad, there are 
few great engineering feats that did not require many people’s suffering, and everybody knows 
this.xxxii  Items (6) and (7) are true, but those traits characterize many highly successful people, 
and, regrettably, the same is true of the trait mentioned in (8).  Item (9) is true of many who 
participate in war, and with (10), Alschuler is merely making a joke.  In sum, if I can show that 
Alschuler is mistaken about (4), we have a very underwhelming case.  Rather than having shown 
that Holmes was Nietzschean, Alschuler merely points out that Holmes was a Nineteenth 
Century maître de soupçon with some personality traits shared by other geniuses the world over. 
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Let us then examine the point about existentialism.  Alschuler contends that Holmes was 
an existentialist.  On a standard understanding of their view, existentialists first “maintain that 
there is no God of any sort, and no absolutes in the realms of value and morality.  There are only 
men and things.  Men find themselves thrown into a cold and hostile world.”xxxiii  But the story 
does not end there, for the existentialist also maintains that humans create value.xxxiv  Thus, 
according to the existentialist, the absence of gods and preexisting moral values should not be a 
cause of despair; rather, it is an opportunity to exercise one’s freedom.  If this common 
understanding of existentialism is the view Alschuler ascribes to Holmes,xxxv he has made a poor 
interpretation of Holmes (and maybe Nietzsche too).xxxvi 
It is true that Holmes doubts the existence of gods and objective moral values like 
existentialists do; however, Holmes differs from them in not accepting voluntarism.  As I 
understand them, existentialists are eager to deny that values are “transcendent givens 
independent of human subjectivity,” or in other words, they deny that values are “irreducible” to 
human wills.xxxvii  On the existentialist view, values are really there, but some of us have wrongly 
understood them as things to be found instead of made.  Holmes, on the other hand, had different 
things to say about value.  In one place he wrote, “We all have cosmic destinies of which we 
cannot divine the end, if the unknown has ends.”xxxviii  Instead of repudiating the thought that 
there are values ontologically independent of human wills, Holmes admitted this possibility but 
denied that we know about such things.  Holmes followed up that sentence with this: “Our 
business is to commit ourselves to life, to accept at once our functions and our ignorance and to 
offer our heart to fate.”xxxix  While the beginning of this passage (“Our business is to commit 
ourselves to life”) might remind one of an existentialist, imploring us to engage in radical choice 
and to create value, Holmes was saying something else.  He instructed us to carry on in spite of 
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“our ignorance” about the ontology of values.  We should not be bothered with the ontology of 
values, claimed Holmes.  This would prove to be a common refrain in his thought: “I think it 
futile to ask what does it all amount to.  One may ask that about all human activities; and to one 
who thinks as I do, there is no answer except that it is not our business to enquire.”xl  As I 
explain below, Holmes’s indifference with respect to the ontology of morals is a central 
component of his pragmatism.  Pragmatism and existentialism are, at bottom, different 
philosophical outlooks.xli 
The foregoing should make it clear that Holmes was no existentialist.  Therefore, 
whatever one wants to say about Nietzsche, existentialism is not an outlook he shared with 
Holmes.  With that, it should be clear that Alschuler has not offered much to substantiate the 
claim that Holmes is Nietzschean.  Next, I turn to Posner’s list of similarities between Holmes 
and Nietzsche.xlii   
For Posner, the points of similarity are (a) use of genealogy, (b) exposing contingent 
systems of values for the contingencies they are, (c) skepticism about reason, (d) anti-mentalism, 
(e) illiberalism, and (f) non-nihilism.  This list is far more interesting than that of Alschuler 
because the items on Posner’s list are idiosyncratic.  If Holmes and Nietzsche did share a number 
of idiosyncratic traits, there is a better case to be made that Holmes was, as Posner put it, “the 
American Nietzsche.” 
 On (a), Posner is largely right.  Nietzsche employed genealogy as did Holmes, though 
Holmes used it to a lesser extent.  Genealogy seeks to show that the causes for a phenomenon 
(e.g. that a population has a particular set of moral beliefs or that a social institution has 
particular features) sharply diverge from the rationales moderns give for that phenomenon.xliii  
For example, “genealogical analysis shows that the concept of liberty is an ‘invention of the 
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ruling classes’ and not fundamental to man’s nature or at the root of his attachment to being and 
truth.”xliv  One can accept this supposed showing about the concept of liberty or not.  The general 
point remains, namely that genealogical analysis seeks undercover the true existence and 
persistence conditions for “those things that continue to exist and have value for us.”xlv  The 
genealogist sets out the real reasons for our convictions and ways of life, not the post-hoc 
rationalizations we settle on later.  Nietzsche famously provided a genealogy of morality.xlvi  In 
his book, The Common Law, Holmes aimed to do much the same for law.  As he wrote, 
 
A very common phenomenon, and one very familiar for the student of history, is this.  
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula.  In the 
course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity disappears, but the rule remains.  The 
reason which gave rise to the rule has been forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves 
to inquire how it is to be accounted for.  Some ground of policy is thought of, which 
seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things; and then the rule 
adapts itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new 
career.xlvii 
 
In this long passage from Holmes, we see him making two genealogy-friendly points, first that 
our legal rules have backstories of which we are unaware and second that our modern 
justifications for our rules are not the reasons for which we follow them.  Posner is thus right 
about (a) and about (b) too.  However, Holmes does not employ genealogical methods in much 
of his work outside of The Common Law.  Genealogy figures in two of Nietzsche’s major works, 
but in Holmes’s other works, genealogy does not make an appearance.  For instance, in his great 
The Nihilist 
11 
 
essay, “On the Path of the Law,” Holmes provided an ahistorical theory about the nature of the 
law and about several doctrinal areas of law.xlviii  In Holmes’s opinions as an appellate judge in 
Massachusetts and on the United States Supreme Court, his decisions are known to be pithy and 
not great pieces of historical scholarship.  This is to say, while Nietzsche was the genealogist, 
Holmes was just an occasional fellow-traveler. 
 What should one make of this supposedly shared skepticism about reason, the trait 
mentioned in (c)?  It is true that both Holmes and Nietzsche were humbler about what reason 
could achieve than others.  Nietzsche, for instance, was skeptical of those philosophers who 
“wanted to supply a rational foundation for morality.”xlix  He seems to have thought that all we 
could do is describe the mores of particular peoples or stump for mores that we like.  Rational 
reflection will not enable us to discover the right mores.  Holmes thought similarly about 
morality and about ‘natural’ legal duties.  He ultimately held these were preferences and that 
“[d]eep-seated preferences can not be argued about.”l  Holmes is also famous for having said, 
“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”li  Relatedly, he called a fallacy 
“the notion that the only force at work in the development of the law is logic.”lii  Again, we hear 
that logic, or rational reflection, will not enable us to discover much about morality or the law.  
So far, this skepticism about reason is just another way of stating (3) from Alschuler’s list, 
namely that Holmes and Nietzsche are skeptical about foundations for values.  Do Holmes and 
Nietzsche go further in decrying reason?  This is doubtful.  Nietzsche, insofar as he engaged in 
genealogical critique, employed and presumed that others would employ reason.  Genealogical 
critiques are arguments that seek to undermine one’s conviction by showing that the process by 
which one came to hold the conviction was not responsive to the reasons that would validate that 
conviction.  To make such critiques is to reason, and to expect others to appreciate such critiques 
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is to believe that they too can reason.  Nietzsche thus had a limited skepticism about reason.  
Much the same is true of Holmes.  Holmes, while denying that reason could help us discover the 
right laws or mores, thought that reason helped elsewhere.  For instance, Holmes once wrote, 
“Reason working on experience does tell us, no doubt, that if our wish to live continues, we can 
do it only [by obeying society’s standards].”liii  In this passage, Holmes was saying that reason 
can help one to make good inductive inferences for one’s personal benefit.  He had other roles 
for reason to play too, for he happily noted that “the man of the future is the man of statistics and 
the master of economics.”liv  Here Holmes claimed that reason facilitates good inductive 
inferences for societal benefit.  It is thus an overstatement to allege that Holmes and Nietzsche 
were reason skeptics.  They saw a more modest role for reason than their excessively rationalist 
contemporaries. 
Let us now turn to (d).  Specifically, Posner writes that “both are sub- or antimentalists.”lv  
In claiming that both Holmes and Nietzsche were anti-mentalists,lvi Posner puts forward 
something that is technically correct but highly misleading.  Posner’s neologism is an umbrella 
term, wide enough to cover two very different positions.  Holmes discouraged using mental 
states as elements for certain legal causes of action.  For instance, he thought that we should not 
understand contracts as requiring a meeting of the minds; rather he thought that we should 
require some non-mental-state objective criterion.  Holmes argued for this way of arranging the 
law because it would lead to more predictable legal outcomes.  While it is hard to prove that 
someone had a particular mental state, it is far easier to prove that someone took a particular 
action.  If one understands mentalism as a commitment to using mental states as elements of 
legal causes of action (which is not an unreasonable understanding of the term), then, sure, 
Holmes is an anti-mentalist.  This understanding has nothing to do with Nietzsche though.  
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Nietzsche thought that conscious mental states do little or nothing to explain action.  If one 
understands mentalism as a commitment to explaining lots of phenomena by reference to 
individuals’ conscious mental states (which is not an unreasonable understanding), then, sure 
Nietzsche is an anti-mentalist.  In a sense, Posner is making an equivocation.  Formally speaking, 
we can interpret away the formal problem of equivocation, for, if anti-mentalism is a disjunctive 
view that includes the positions of both Holmes and Nietzsche, there is no equivocation.  But any 
such fix makes Posner’s comparison weak.  Instead of showing that Holmes and Nietzsche 
shared some significant, idiosyncratic view, he will have shown that they held different views 
that we can lump together in an entirely ad hoc way, which affords no explanatory gains. 
On (e), Posner is right that Holmes and Nietzsche are both illiberal, but this commonality 
is less interesting than it appears.  In fact, that this attribution looks like an interesting point says 
more about us than it says about Holmes or Nietzsche.  Being illiberal is far stranger now that it 
was before.  Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Marx, and Schmitt are all illiberal.  
It is only now with the modern ascendancy of liberalism that someone’s illiberalism is an oddity.  
In the time of Holmes and Nietzsche, this ascendancy was not yet complete.  Vestiges of 
feudalism and aristocratic values still had place, and these Holmes and Nietzsche both embraced. 
Discussing Holmes’s and Nietzsche’s reactions to nihilism takes up the space of the next 
section, so I defer thinking about point (f) until then.  Even with that task deferred, it is worth 
taking stock of the long and meandering conversation, comparing Nietzsche and Holmes.  I have 
sought to closely consider two commentaries, which claim that Holmes is a Nietzschean.  
Alschuler had a ten-point list of similarities, and I argued that this list contained too many 
commonplaces to sustain the notion that Holmes and Nietzsche shared anything too deep.  The 
only substantial and idiosyncratic trait on the Alschuler’s list, namely existentialism, is not 
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shared after all.  Posner had a shorter list, but one with more promise because of its idiosyncratic 
traits.  I argued that while none of the supposed commonalities proved to be flat-out wrong, they 
ultimately showed less than they promised.  The foregoing should lead one to think that calling 
Holmes a Nietzschean is not so much incorrect as unhelpful. 
 
Nietzsche and Holmes as Anti-Nihilists 
In this last substantive section of the chapter, I show that Holmes and Nietzsche were 
anti-nihilists but of different stripes.  Holmes was a pragmatist, and this led him to take issue 
with the reasons for which people adopt nihilism.  Nietzsche actually approved of the reasons for 
people adopt nihilism but still thought it presented a problem.  Organizationally, first I explain 
what it would mean to call Holmes a pragmatist.  Next, I offer evidence that Holmes endorsed 
pragmatism.  Then, I show how pragmatism functions as a kind of anti-nihilism.  Finally, I 
contrast this kind of anti-nihilism with the variety on offer from Nietzsche. 
To show that Holmes was a pragmatist, first I must make clear what will and will not 
suffice as a showing.  Some who are convinced that Holmes was not a pragmatist are happy to 
rest their hats on the fact that Holmes had few kind words to say about William James, one of the 
classical pragmatists.lvii  Others are content to note that Holmes eschewed the label 
pragmatist.lviii  These points, however, will not suffice.  Charles Sanders Peirce, the founder of 
pragmatism, also disliked James’s philosophy and also eschewed the label.  We have to dig a 
little deeper. 
One might think that espousing the pragmatist theory of truth is the sine qua non of 
pragmatism, but espousing that thesis is sufficient but not necessary.  Peirce denied it,lix and so 
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have many other famous pragmatists.lx As I explain below, Holmes denied it too, but that should 
not count him out. 
For our purposes, Holmes will count as a pragmatist if he holds that the goal of inquiry is 
practical.  More precisely, Holmes was a pragmatist, if he thought that we should test various 
propositions against practical criteria – such as whether accepting a given proposition will help 
us to cope with the world or whether accepting the proposition satisfies certain desires we have.  
Someone is a pragmatist if she tests propositions by such practical criteria and not by purely 
descriptive criteria, such as whether we are accurately tracking mind-independent facts. 
Having set a standard for how to tell if Holmes was a pragmatist, let us examine the 
evidence.  It is well-known that Holmes made critical remarks about Williams James.  On one 
occasion, he wryly summed up James as having claimed that “by yearning we can modify the 
multiplication table.”lxi  Holmes was caricaturing James, but Holmes the lampoonist himself 
once wrote that “Thinking is an instrument of adjustment to the conditions of life.”lxii  This 
sounds mighty pragmatist, for it suggests that the criteria by which to appraise our thinking is by 
how well it enables us adjust to the conditions of life, not by how accurately thought represents 
the world as it is.lxiii  If this interpretation is right, the ridicule of James can appear in new light.  
Perhaps Holmes was saying the following.  We should not modify the multiplication tables just 
because we so yearn; we will not be well-adjusted to the conditions of life, if we act like that. 
I am suggesting that Holmes adopted an instrumentalist understanding of inquiry, which 
is sufficient (but perhaps not necessary)lxiv for pragmatism.  This instrumentalist understanding 
of inquiry is not identical to holding the pragmatist theory of truth.  According to the pragmatist 
theory of truth, a proposition is true if and only if believing or accepting that proposition satisfies 
some practical end of some set of agents.  The instrumentalist understanding of inquiry differs 
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from the pragmatist theory of truth in that the former tells us how to inquire while the latter tells 
us about the metaphysics of truth.  One might adopt the former because one already adopts the 
latter, but these are conceptually distinct.  Holmes, contrary to what some commentators 
contend,lxv did not espouse the pragmatist theory of truth.  In fact, he likely espoused a more 
traditional correspondence theory of truth, which claims that a proposition is true if and only if 
that proposition corresponds to how the world is.  Holmes’s skepticism can be summed up as the 
idea that “truth serves as an unattainable ideal.”lxvi  Why is truth unattainable?  Holmes thought 
both that we cannot capture the world as it is and that the truth means capturing of the world as it 
is.  Therefore, his skepticism presupposes the correspondence theory. 
Looking to Holmes’s most famous pronouncement on truth, we find no contradiction 
with my reading.  Famously and frequently, Holmes proclaimed, “all I mean by truth is what I 
can’t help thinking.”lxvii  Despite appearances, this is no claim about the metaphysics of truth.  
This claim is epistemic.  Holmes was voicing his familiar skepticism.  He claimed that those 
propositions he called true were just those that he could not help believing.  Holmes was thus 
admitting that he had no justification for those beliefs other than that he had come to hold them 
and hold them so strongly that he could not believe otherwise.  Holmes thought we are all in this 
epistemic situation.  He thereby opposed two kinds of anti-skeptics.  He opposed the typical anti-
skeptic, the person who claims an ability to fit her beliefs to the cosmos.  As he said, “the 
universe has in it more than we understand.”lxviii  Holmes also opposed the idealist anti-skeptic, 
the person who thinks that the cosmos must fit her beliefs.  Holmes explicitly denied that the 
limits of his scheme of beliefs are “necessarily limits to [the cosmos].”lxix 
Once we see Holmes’s pragmatism, his anti-nihilism becomes more discernible too.  
Holmes was skeptical about moral truth and the existence of gods, but he did not succumb to 
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nihilism due to his pragmatism about morality and other matters.  Nihilism, marked by a 
negative attitude toward life, is an inference people draw from moral nihilism (or skepticism, 
atheism, some other lack that can frustrate someone’s hopes).  For Holmes, such hopes are the 
seeds of nihilism.  The proto-nihilist aims to discover, inter alia, the true moral values, but, 
according to Holmes, when we are trying to determine what to do, our task is not to track such 
values but rather to settle on a course of action that works, that helps us to adjust to the 
conditions of life.  After we deliberate and arrive at our best answers to practical questions, it is 
“unnecessary to demand of the Cosmos an assurance that to it also our best is superlative,” said 
Holmes.lxx  The proto-nihilist wants such assurance and becomes a full-fledged, depressed 
nihilist when she judges that the Cosmos will not give it to her.  It is likely his skepticism that led 
Holmes to suggest that we give up on the task of tracking moral (and other) truths, but whatever 
his reasons, once we do abandon that task, we must abandon it completely and no longer worry 
about moral ontology and epistemology writ large.  This is why Holmes kept saying that it was 
not our business to inquire about the source and true nature of morality or to wonder whether our 
values are the true ones.  We have seen how Holmes avoided nihilism for himself, why the 
absence of moral values did not lead him to infer that “we have nothing to do but to sit still and 
let time run over us.”lxxi  We can also see that Holmes went further.  He was someone who 
decried nihilism.  He thought that falling into nihilism was to make an important mistake, to 
think that our task as humans is something that it isn’t.lxxii  As he once put it, “Having made up 
your mind that you are not God don’t lie awake nights with cosmic worries.”lxxiii  Ultimately, 
Holmes thought nihilism was a foolish, arrogant misapprehension of the point of human life. 
Nietzsche, like Holmes, went beyond non-nihilism and adopted a kind of anti-nihilism.  
However, Nietzsche had a different complaint to lodge against nihilism.  By turns, he called it 
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“the danger of dangers”lxxiv and “pathological.”lxxv  Because nihilism is an equivocal term, one 
might wonder whether, in making these claims, Nietzsche relied on the same understanding as I 
have in our discussion.  Indeed, he did.  He not only understood the phenomenon in the same 
sense, but he also understood the etiology the same.  For Nietzsche, nihilism is a negative 
attitude toward life brought on by a recognition that morality and divinity are not as one has long 
suspected.  Nietzsche hoped that we would supersede this attitude.  In one place, he wrote 
longingly, “This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal 
[Christianity and its attendant focus on God and absolute moral values] but also from that which 
was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to nothingness, nihilism… he must come 
one day.”lxxvi 
Nietzsche claimed that nihilism is dangerous.  To my knowledge, he does not define this 
danger.  In calling nihilism pathological and by analogizing it to nausea, he seems to have 
suggested that nihilism is painful for its adherent.   Whatever the precise danger, danger is the 
heart of Nietzsche’s worry.  This differs markedly from Holmes.  Holmes, again, held that the 
nihilist is a fool who misunderstands the purpose of human life.  While Nietzsche would likely 
agree with that sentiment, his worry centers on the danger that nihilism presents.  The 
misunderstanding that nihilism entails was just not as worrisome for Nietzsche.  In fact, 
Nietzsche, unlike Holmes, thought that nihilism was a necessary, transitory stage toward 
enlightenment.lxxvii  Nihilism “was bound to grow out of” the collapse of the “reigning ideal.”  
Holmes, by contrast, did not think nihilism was necessary.  For him, nihilism is an unforced 
error. 
 
Conclusion 
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 This chapter has sought to show that Holmes was not a ‘Nietzschean nihilist.’  When they 
accused him of nihilism, Holmes’s commentators were claiming that Holmes adopted a negative 
attitude toward the project of life, brought on by finding out that the world lacks something that 
he wished were there, such as absolute moral values or deities.   Holmes was not a nihilist so 
understood because he was a fairly optimistic man who thought that the presence or absence of 
moral values and deities should have no effect on one’s spirits.  Holmes was also not a 
Nietzschean.  The differences between the two are several, and the commonalities are ultimately 
too commonplace to draw any interesting inferences.  One commonality between the two is that 
they both were anti-nihilists, that is, they both thought that nihilism is a grave error.  But even in 
this similarity, Holmes and Nietzsche differed.  Holmes was a pragmatist, someone who 
understood our task as humans to be one of striving, coping, adjusting ourselves to the conditions 
of the world.  As a result, Holmes thought we should be unconcerned with the metaphysical 
questions that occasion nihilism.  Nietzsche, on the other hand, saw no problem with having 
metaphysical concerns.  He even thought that nihilism was an inevitability, if one paid attention 
to the world and noticed its deficits (e.g. that there is no God).  Nietzsche’s problem with the 
nihilist is that she poses a danger.  Nietzsche hoped that those of us who recognize the death of 
God will move on and supersede the dangerous state of mind that nihilism is.  Nietzsche thought 
he had, and thus ‘Nietzschean nihilist’ is an oxymoron.  All the more reason why Holmes was no 
such thing. 
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